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A. Cloud-Based Service
1 Before embarking on a discussion of breathing space 
for cloud-based business models, it is necessary to 
clarify the type of websites that will be addressed 
in the following analysis. As it is difficult to trace 
the conceptual contours of the ‘cloud’,1 a wide va-
riety of online platforms inevitably enters the pic-
ture. If the ‘cloud’ is equated with the Internet, the 
discussion may even degenerate into a general de-
bate on the scope of copyright protection in the di-
gital environment. 
2 To avoid this generalization, the present inquiry will 
focus on services that offer individual users the op-
portunity of storing copyrighted material on an on-
Abstract:  Cloud-based services keep form-
ing, changing and evaporating like clouds in the sky. 
They range from personal storage space for films 
and music to social media and user-generated con-
tent platforms. The copyright issues raised by these 
platforms seem as numerous as the liquid droplets 
and frozen crystals constituting clouds in the atmo-
sphere of our planet. As providers of cloud-based ser-
vices may seek to avoid dependence on creative indus-
tries and collecting societies, one of these questions 
concerns the breathing space that copyright law of-
fers outside the realm of exclusive rights. Which lim-
itations of protection can serve as a basis for the de-
velopment of new business models? Which safe har 
 
 
bours may be invoked to avoid secondary liability for 
copyright infringement? Which obligations may result 
from injunctions sought by copyright owners? After 
outlining relevant cloud services (section 1) and iden-
tifying the competing interests involved (section 2), 
the inquiry will address these influence factors – limi-
tations, safe harbours and injunctions (section 3). The 
analysis will yield the insight that the most effective 
protection of copyright in the cloud is likely to result 
from acceptance of a compromise solution that, instead 
of insisting on the power to prohibit unauthorised use, 
leaves room for the interests of users and the business 
models of platform providers (concluding section 4).
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line platform.2 This clarification still leaves room for 
the inclusion of various types of platforms and ser-
vices. A distinction can be drawn, however, with re-
gard to the size of the target audience:
• an online platform for posting photographs, 
such as Flickr, or an online platform for posting 
videos, such as YouTube, allows individual users 
to make content generally available on the In-
ternet. In this case, the general public with ac-
cess to the Internet is the target audience.
• a social networking site, such as Facebook, al-
lows individual users to post various types of 
works, such as texts, photographs and videos. 
In this case, the target audience is not the gene-
ral public. It is a specific group of Internet users 
having access to the personal webpages of the 
individual user providing content.
• a digital locker service allowing individual users 
to upload personal copies of protected works to 
personal cloud storage space for later downloa-
ding or streaming on multiple devices, or a pri-
vate video recorder allowing users to obtain re-
cordings of TV programmes for the purpose of 
watching them at a more convenient time. In 
this case, the target audience is confined to the 
individual user.
B. Interests Involved
3 On the basis of this outline of relevant storage servi-
ces, the different stakeholders involved can be iden-
tified: copyright owners, platform providers and in-
dividual users. If cloud-based services are used to 
disseminate protected works without prior authori-
zation, copyright owners may want to invoke their 
exclusive rights to prohibit the use or claim an ap-
propriate reward.3 They will point out that without 
the enforcement of their rights, sufficient incentives 
for new creativity, on-going investment in cultural 
productions and an adequate income from creative 
work cannot be ensured.4 
4 Platform providers, however, will argue that a gene-
ral obligation to monitor the data streams genera-
ted by users is too heavy a burden, and that instead, 
the risk of platforms being held liable for copyright 
infringement must be minimized. Otherwise, expo-
sure to that risk would force them to close down 
their websites. The vibrant Internet as we know it 
today would cease to exist.5 
5 Finally, individual users benefitting from cloud-
based services are not unlikely to emphasize that 
their interests go far beyond mere convenience and 
entertainment. Online platforms for publishing pho-
tographs and videos afford them the opportunity to 
get actively involved in the creation of online con-
tent. Enhanced user participation strengthens the 
role of the Internet as a democratic medium that 
offers room for a wide variety of opinions and con-
tributions.6 Social media offer new forms of self-ex-
pression and social interaction. Private video recor-
ders can be seen as a service facilitating access to TV 
streams and, therefore, as a means of supporting the 
receipt of information.7
6 The protection of copyright is thus to be reconciled 
with several competing interests. Against this back-
ground, policy makers are not unlikely to weigh the 
rationales of copyright protection against other va-
lues, such as freedom of expression and informa-
tion, the interest in maintaining an open Internet, 
the freedom to conduct a business and a participa-
tory Internet culture. Moreover, it must not be over-
looked that at the policy level, economic considera-
tions may play a crucial role. As a medium that keeps 
generating new business models, the Internet still 
offers a remarkable potential for economic growth.8 
Breathing space for the development of cloud-based 
services, therefore, can be part of a country’s inno-
vation policies.9 
C. Survey of Flexibility Tools
7 Given the diversity of interests involved, it is not 
surprising that different strategies have emerged 
to regulate the impact of copyright protection on 
cloud-based services. A survey of available regula-
tory instruments leads to a matrix of copyright li-
mitations, safe harbours for hosting, and injunctions 
against online platforms. Copyright limitations can 
be adopted to exempt certain forms of generating 
online content from the control of the copyright ow-
ner (subsection C I). Safe harbours for hosting servi-
ces can be introduced to shield platform providers 
against the risk of secondary liability for infringing 
content made available by users (subsection C II). In-
junctions against platforms providers (subsection C 
III) can be granted to allow copyright owners to take 
action against infringers.
I. Copyright Limitations
8 As clarified above, the present inquiry focuses on 
services that offer individual users the opportunity 
of storing copyrighted material on an online plat-
form. Depending on the involvement of the user in 
the creation of the content, and the target audience 
that is reached, different limitations of copyright 
can become relevant in this context. Breathing space 
may result from inherent limits of exclusive rights, 
such as limits set to the right of adaptation in nati-
onal law. It may also result from the adoption of ex-
ceptions that exempt certain forms of use from the 
control of the copyright owner. To provide an over-
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view, amateur remixes of protected works (C I 1) can 
be distinguished from the use of links (C I 2) and pri-
vate copying (C I 3). The discussion, finally, leads to 
whether a more flexible approach to limitations is 
required to keep pace with the fast development of 
cloud-based services (C I 4).
1. Quotations, Adaptations and Remixes
9 In many cases, users of cloud-based services will up-
load their own literary or artistic creations to on-
line platforms and social networking sites. If the 
protected work of another author is quoted, adap-
ted or remixed, however, the question arises whe-
ther a copyright limitation can be invoked to justify 
the unauthorised use. In most countries, the debate 
on user-generated content has not yet led to agree-
ment on specific exceptions.10 The inclusion or ad-
aptation of protected material thus depends on the 
scope of traditional copyright limitations. The ta-
king of portions of a protected work can constitute 
a permissible quotation.11 An adaptation seeking to 
ridicule the original work may fall under the exem-
ption of parody.12 
10 In copyright systems providing for an open-ended 
fair use limitation, specific criteria may be available 
to draw a line between infringing copying and per-
missible remix and reuse. Under the US fair use doc-
trine, for instance, the notion of transformative use 
traditionally constitutes an important factor capa-
ble of tipping the scales to a finding of fair use.13 In 
the famous parody case Campbell v Acuff-Rose, the 
US Supreme Court explained with regard to the fair 
use analysis: 
The central purpose of this investigation is to see […] whether the 
new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation […] 
or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new 
work is ‘transformative’.14
11 In comments on the fair use doctrine, the notion of 
transformative use is understood in the sense of pro-
ductive use. The fair use must aim to employ the co-
pyrighted matter in a different manner or for a pur-
pose different from the original. Mere repackaging 
or republication is insufficient. By contrast, a use ad-
ding value to the original, transforming the original 
in new information, new aesthetics, new insights 
and understandings, constitutes ‘the very type of 
activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect 
for the enrichment of society’.15 The identification 
of use that supports freedom of speech and cultu-
ral follow-on innovation, therefore, lies at the core 
of the analysis. 
12 This rationale can serve as a guiding principle when 
a distinction must be drawn between infringing and 
permissible user-generated content. In Warner Bros. 
and J.K. Rowling v RDR Books, for instance, the US 
District Court for the Southern District of New York 
assessed the contents of an online Harry Potter fan 
site in the light of the notion of transformative use.16 
The platform Harry Potter – The Lexicon provides 
an encyclopaedia of the individual characters, ma-
gic spells, beasts, potions, etc. described in the Harry 
Potter books.17 Inevitably, this requires the reuse of 
parts of the original Harry Potter books. The Court, 
however, took as a starting point that The Lexicon 
was transformative: 
Because it serves these reference purposes, rather than the enter-
tainment or aesthetic purposes of the original works, the Lexicon’s 
use is transformative and does not supplant the objects of the Harry 
Potter works…18
13 The recognition of this added value to the general 
public, however, did not hinder the judge from hol-
ding that verbatim copying on the fan site amounted 
to copyright infringement where it was in excess of 
the legitimate purpose of providing a reference tool. 
The wholesale taking of substantial portions of back-
ground material provided by J.K. Rowling herself, for 
instance, did not constitute fair use. The Court thus 
drew a line between permissible content supporting 
the transformative character of the website and in-
fringing content that was unnecessary for the refe-
rence purposes served by The Lexicon.
14 Breathing space for user-generated adaptations of 
copyrighted works may also result from inherent li-
mits set to the right of adaptation in national legisla-
tion. The adaptation right granted in the Dutch Co-
pyright Act, for instance, does not cover adaptations 
constituting ‘a new, original work’.19 Hence, certain 
forms of adaptations remain free from the outset.20 
A similar mechanism for providing breathing space 
can be found in the German Copyright Act which 
contains a free use principle exempting adaptations 
that constitute ‘independent works’,21 and the Aus-
trian Copyright Act which exempts ‘independent, 
new works’ resulting from an adaptation.22 Trans-
formations of protected works falling under these 
free adaptation rules are immune against copyright 
claims brought by the copyright owner whose work 
served as a basis for the adaptation. Traditionally, 
the courts in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands 
created room for parody in this way.23
15 When a free adaptation rule of this kind is invoked, 
the crucial question becomes which criteria are 
applied to identify those adaptations that can be 
deemed free in the sense that they do not affect the 
copyright owner’s right of adaptation. Under the 
German free adaptation rule, this question is answe-
red by requiring a transformation of the original 
work to have new features of its own that make the 
individual features of the original work fade away.24 
Applying this standard, the German Federal Court 
of Justice recognised in parody cases that the requi-
red distance from the original work, making its in-
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dividual features fade away, could not only be achie-
ved through substantial alterations of the original 
work. By contrast, an inner distance, such as the di-
stance created by a parodist’s mockery, could also 
be sufficient.25 
16 When applied broadly, this line of reasoning could 
become relevant in cases of user-generated content. 
Arguably, the individual, non-commercial nature of 
amateur remixes may also justify to assume an inner 
distance from the underlying original work. If the 
remix clearly constitutes an amateur creation that 
is presented on the Internet without profit motive, 
the contrast with the original work will be obvious 
to the Internet public. User-generated content fal-
ling in this category could then be exempted on the 
grounds that it constitutes an ‘independent work’ 
that makes the features of the original work fade 
away.26 The fact that the rules on free adaptations 
have often been applied in parody cases does not 
exclude an extension to other areas, such as user-
generated content. In the Perlentaucher case, for 
instance, the German Federal Court of Justice confir-
med the general applicability of the principles gover-
ning the determination of free adaptations. In this 
case, the question of a free adaptation arose with 
regard to abstracts derived from book reviews in 
the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung.27 The sound sampling case Metall auf Metall 
can serve as a further example of the universal ap-
plicability of the rules governing free adaptations.28
17 Breathing space for adaptations of protected works 
may thus follow from specific exceptions, such as the 
right of quotation and the exemption of parody. It 
may also result from open-ended copyright limita-
tions supporting transformative use and free adap-
tation rules leaving room for derivative works that 
keep a sufficient (inner) distance from the original 
work. When a remix or adaptation does not amount 
to copyright infringement, the resulting deriva-
tive work can be disseminated on the Internet wit-
hout encroaching upon the exclusive rights of the 
author whose work served as a basis for the remix. 
Breathing space for remixing and adapting protec-
ted works, thus, also creates breathing space for on-
line platforms and social media that allow users to 
present their remixes and adaptations to the public.
2. Embedded Content
18 For sharing information about a literary or artis-
tic creation, a user of cloud-based services need not 
necessarily upload the copyrighted work as such. 
Instead, a link can be sufficient to draw the atten-
tion of other users to protected content that has al-
ready been made available elsewhere on the Inter-
net. The user of a social networking platform, for 
instance, may use a link to ‘embed’ protected con-
tent from an external source in her personal pages. 
The external content may then be displayed within 
a frame that is integrated in the user’s webpages – 
a technique often referred to as ‘framing’ or ‘in-line 
linking’. In contrast to the traditional hyperlink with 
underlined blue text, visitors of the personal pages 
need not leave the networking site when following 
the link. By contrast, the embedded content – for ex-
ample, a music video – is shown within the frame-
work of the personal pages. This advanced form of 
embedded linking raises delicate copyright issues.29 
19 On the one hand, it may be argued that the embed-
ded link makes the work available for a new public 
– the group of Internet users having access to the 
user’s personal webpages. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, it may be qualified as a relevant act of commu-
nication to the public comparable with the further 
distribution of radio and TV signals in hotels, or a 
relevant act of public performance comparable with 
the playing of radio music in restaurants.30 This par-
allel is doubtful, however, because at least a classical 
hyperlink does not extend the audience. It merely 
indicates the location of content that has already 
been made available to the Internet audience on 
another webpage.31 With regard to ‘frames’ and ‘in-
line links’, it would have to be explained against this 
background why the use of a more advanced linking 
technique justifies the assumption that there is a 
new audience to be distinguished from the audience 
formed by Internet users in general.32
20 Given these doubts, an emphasis may be laid, on the 
other hand, on the fact that the embedded link only 
provides a reference to protected content that is al-
ready available for Internet users on another web-
site. As long as it is clear that the content stems from 
another online source,33 the embedded link does not 
differ substantially from a traditional hyperlink that, 
according to established case law, does not consti-
tute an infringing act of communication to the pub-
lic. In the EU, the German Federal Court of Justice 
recognised in its famous Paperboy decision that 
without search services availing themselves of hy-
perlinks to indicate the location of online content, 
the abundant information available on the Internet 
could not be found and used in an efficient way.34 In 
line with previous statements in literature,35 hyper-
links were seen as mere footnotes: a means of safe-
guarding freedom of information in the digital en-
vironment and ensuring the proper functioning of 
the Internet. Taking this insight as a starting point, 
the Court arrived at the conclusion that a hyperlink 
– the case concerned deep links to press articles – 
did not amount to copyright infringement: 
21 A person who sets a hyperlink to a website with 
a work protected under copyright law which has 
been made available to the public by the copyright 
owner, does not commit an act of exploitation un-
der copyright law by doing so but only refers to the 
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work in a manner which facilitates the access al-
ready provided.36
22 The Court fortified this approach by pointing out 
that the person setting the hyperlink refrained from 
keeping the work on demand or transmitting it her-
self. Moreover, that person had no control over the 
availability of the work. If the web page containing 
the work was deleted, the hyperlink would miss its 
target and become pointless.37 The courts in other 
EU Member States lent weight to similar arguments 
in the context of more advanced forms of linking. 
In the Vorschaubilder case, the Austrian Supreme 
Court, for instance, developed the following line of 
reasoning with regard to picture thumbnails of por-
trait photographs that had been displayed as search 
results together with the URL of the source webpage:
Only the person who has the original or a copy of a work can make 
that work available to other persons in a way that allows him to con-
trol access to the work. A person […] who only provides a link that can 
be used to view the work at its original location, however, only facil-
itates access to a file included in the source website without making 
that work available himself in the sense of § 18a of the Copyright Act. 
Under these circumstances, he does not control access, as the file can 
be deleted without his intervention….38
23 These examples show that breathing space for re-
ferences to online content can be derived from an 
interpretation of the exclusive rights of copyright 
owners that leaves room for the application of dif-
ferent kinds of links. The considerations supporting 
the refusal of copyright infringement in the Ger-
man Paperboy case and the Austrian Vorschaubilder 
case can be employed to exempt the use of ‘frames’ 
and ‘in-line links’ to provide references to external 
content on social networking pages.39 As long as the 
use does not amount to an infringement of other 
intellectual property rights or an act of unfair com-
petition, this exemption would have the result of 
platform providers being free to offer ‘framing’ and 
‘in-line linking’ as features of their platforms and 
users being free to refer to content available else-
where on the Internet. 
3. Digital Lockers
24 While breathing space for the use of cloud-based ser-
vices may thus result from limits that are set to ex-
clusive rights, copyright exceptions can also consti-
tute an important basis for new cloud-based services. 
The exemption of private copying, for instance, can 
serve as a basis for digital lockers or personal TV re-
corders. If a protected work is uploaded to a platform 
offering personal storage space for films and music, 
the creation of a cloud copy may qualify as a per-
missible act of private copying. This is true, at least, 
when the cloud copy is made by the private user and 
access to that copy is confined to the individual user 
making personal use of the digital locker for the pur-
pose of private study and enjoyment. 
25 In this vein, the US Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held in the Cablevision case with regard to 
an online video recorder that, first, it was the user, 
rather than Cablevision as a provider, who did the 
copying produced by the recording system;40 and, 
second, that the transmission of works required for 
the playback function of the service did not amount 
to a relevant act of public performance
[b]ecause each RS-DVR playback transmission is made to a single 
subscriber using a single unique copy produced by that subscriber.41 
26 Similarly, the German Federal Court of Justice held 
in the Shift.TV case that, rather than the provider of 
the service, the private user of the automated sys-
tem for recording TV broadcasts was responsible for 
making copies of protected works, and that the pub-
lic required for an act of communication to the pu-
blic was missing because each individual copy was 
made available only to the subscriber who had made 
that copy.42 However, this decision in favour of the 
applicability of private use privileges did not hinder 
the German Federal Court of Justice from also fin-
ding that the transmission of over-the-air TV signals 
to the online recorders of private subscribers could 
be qualified as an infringing act of retransmission.43 
The Court, therefore, neutralized its initial finding 
in favour of private use by also holding that the au-
tomated Shift.TV system might encroach upon the 
retransmission right of broadcasting organizations.44 
27 From the outset, the invocation of private use as a 
defence was excluded by the Supreme Court of Ja-
pan in the Rokuraku II decision. In this case, an em-
phasis was laid on the preparatory acts of receiving 
and feeding TV broadcasts carried out by the service 
provider. As these preparatory acts finally enabled 
the private user to obtain a copy of the works, the 
Court held that it was not the private user, but the 
provider of the TV recorder system who made the 
copies of TV programmes.45 
28 These divergent court decisions do not come as a 
surprise. Traditionally, the exception for private co-
pying is one of the most controversial exceptions in 
copyright law.46 National private copying systems 
differ substantially in terms of scope and reach. Re-
strictive systems may not offer more than the op-
portunity to make a recording of a TV programme 
for the purpose of watching it at a more conveni-
ent time (‘time-shifting’).47 As demonstrated by the 
Cablevision case in the US, even a private copying 
regime with this limited scope may offer breathing 
space for an online service that facilitates time-shif-
ting by allowing subscribers to make a recording of 
TV programmes in the cloud. 
29 More generous private copying regimes are not con-
fined to time-shifting. Several continental European 
copyright regimes may generally allow the uploa-
ding of copies to personal storage space in the cloud 
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for private use as long as the initiative for the repro-
duction is taken by the private user.48 However, diffe-
rences between these more generous systems follow 
from the individual configuration of the use privi-
lege at the national level. Must the private copy be 
made by the private user herself? Or could it also be 
made by a third party on her behalf? In the latter 
case, does it matter whether this third person deri-
ves economic benefit from the private copying? Does 
private copying require the use of a legal source? Or 
may even an illegal source serve as a basis for a le-
gitimate private copy?49 Does it become relevant in 
this context whether the illegality was evident to 
the private user?50
30 While these nuances must be taken into account 
when determining the permissible ambit of opera-
tion of digital locker services, a further layer of legal 
complexity results from the fact that at least broad 
private copying exemptions not focusing on speci-
fic purposes will give rise to an obligation to provide 
for the payment of equitable remuneration. Other-
wise, the private copying regime is not unlikely to 
cause an unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate 
interests of the copyright owner in the sense of the 
third step of the international three-step test.51 The 
possibility of reducing an unreasonable prejudice to 
a reasonable level through the payment of equitable 
remuneration is reflected in the drafting history of 
the first international three-step test laid down in 
Article 9(2) BC. At the 1967 Stockholm Conference, 
Main Committee I – working on the substantive pro-
visions of the Berne Convention – gave the following 
example to illustrate this feature of the internatio-
nal three-step test:
A practical example might be photocopying for various purposes. If 
it consists of producing a very large number of copies, it may not be 
permitted, as it conflicts with a normal exploitation of the work. If it 
implies a rather large number of copies for use in industrial under-
takings, it may not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the author, provided that, according to national legislation, an equi-
table remuneration is paid. If a small number of copies is made, pho-
tocopying may be permitted without payment, particularly for indi-
vidual or scientific use.52 
31 The determination of an adequate level of equita-
ble remuneration for a broad private copying pri-
vilege is a challenging task. In the European Union, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
sought to provide an answer in the Padawan decis-
ion. The CJEU stated that
fair compensation must necessarily be calculated on the basis of the 
criterion of the harm caused to authors of protected works by the in-
troduction of the private copying exception.53
32 The Court also made it clear that a distinction had to 
be drawn between private users who could be expec-
ted to copy protected works,54 and professional users 
who were unlikely to make private copies. While the 
payment of fair compensation had to cover the use 
made by private users, professionals would use the 
available storage space for professional purposes not 
involving the unauthorised reproduction of the pro-
tected works of third parties. Professional users thus 
had to be exempted from the payment obligation.55 
33 In the case of a digital locker in the cloud, this ap-
proach taken in the EU would mean that the calcu-
lation of equitable remuneration requires an assess-
ment of the harm flowing from the cloud service 
and a distinction between private and professional 
use. The impressive list of prejudicial questions on 
adequate remuneration that is currently pending 
before the CJEU56 indicates that the application of 
this standard poses substantial difficulties already 
with regard to traditional storage media and copy-
ing equipment.57 Private copying in the cloud is not 
unlikely to generate further prejudicial questions in 
the near future.58
4. Update of Exceptions
34 Besides the difficulty of ascertaining the amount of 
equitable remuneration, the uploading of private 
copies to digital lockers in the cloud also raises im-
portant questions with regard to the further deve-
lopment of the exception for private copying and 
copyright exceptions in general. In practice, the pro-
vider of private storage space in the cloud is not un-
likely to avoid the multiplication of identical private 
copies on the server. If several subscribers upload 
the same film to their individual digital lockers, the 
provider may decide to give these users access to 
one central master copy instead of allowing them 
to make several identical copies.
35 In light of the rules established in copyright law, 
however, use of a master copy that can be accessed 
by a potentially large group of subscribers gives rise 
to the question whether the use can still be quali-
fied as an act of private copying. On the one hand, 
the use possibilities of the individual users are not 
enhanced. From a functional perspective, the mas-
ter copy is only used to achieve a result identical to 
the situation arising from the storage of a unique 
private copy for each individual subscriber. On the 
other hand, the use of a single master copy for the 
execution of several requests may be seen as an in-
fringing act of making this master copy available to 
a broader public.59 From a technical perspective, the 
fact remains that the subscriber does not have ac-
cess to a unique cloud copy made on the basis of the 
file she has on her personal computer. Instead, she 
obtains access to a master copy that is made availa-
ble by the provider of the digital locker. 
36 Hence, the question arises whether the private copy-
ing exception can be interpreted flexibly on the ba-
sis of a functional analysis or must be read narrowly 
in line with a technical analysis. A functional analy-
sis would focus on the use possibilities of the private 
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user. As long as these possibilities are not enhan-
ced in comparison with a situation where a unique 
copy is made for each individual subscriber, use of a 
master copy would still fall within the scope of the 
private copying exception. The breathing space for 
digital locker services would thus increase. A tech-
nical analysis, by contrast, would allow the scrutiny 
of each individual act of use carried out by the pro-
vider of cloud storage space. Accordingly, it makes 
a difference whether each subscriber makes and ob-
tains access to her own unique copy (communication 
to the public may be denied), or whether instead, the 
provider offers access to a master copy (communi-
cation to the public may be assumed). 
37 In the EU, room for a flexible, functional approach 
to cloud-based private copying services cannot rea-
dily be derived from CJEU jurisprudence. Formally, 
the CJEU adhered to the dogma of strict interpre-
tation of copyright exceptions in the Infopaq/DDF 
case. Scrutinizing the mandatory exemption of tran-
sient copies in EU copyright law,60 the Court poin-
ted out that for the interpretation of each of the cu-
mulative conditions of the exception, it should be 
borne in mind that,
according to settled case-law, the provisions of a directive which de-
rogate from a general principle established by that directive must 
be interpreted strictly […]. This holds true for the exemption provi-
ded for in Article 5(1) of Directive 2001/29, which is a derogation from 
the general principle established by that directive, namely the requi-
rement of authorisation from the rightholder for any reproduction 
of a protected work.61
38 According to the Court, 
[t]his is all the more so given that the exemption must be interpre-
ted in the light of Article 5(5) of Directive 2001/29, under which that 
exemption is to be applied only in certain special cases which do 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-
matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests 
of the rightholder.62
39 This further consideration seems to indicate that 
the Court infers, from the three-step test enshrined 
in the Information Society Directive, the necessity 
of a strict interpretation of exceptions. In Football 
Association Premier League, however, the decision 
in Infopaq/DDF did not hinder the Court from em-
phasizing with regard to the same exemption the 
need to guarantee its proper functioning and en-
sure an interpretation that takes due account of the 
exemption’s objective and purpose. The Court exp-
lained that, in spite of the required strict interpreta-
tion of the conditions set forth in Article 5(1) of the 
Information Society Directive,
the interpretation of those conditions must enable the effectiveness 
of the exception thereby established to be safeguarded and permit 
observance of the exception’s purpose as resulting in particular from 
recital 31 in the preamble to the Copyright Directive and from Com-
mon Position (EC) No 48/2000 adopted by the Council on 28 Septem-
ber 2000 with a view to adopting that directive (OJ 2000 C 344, p. 1).63
40 The Court went on to explain more generally that
[i]n accordance with its objective, that exception must allow and en-
sure the development and operation of new technologies and safegu-
ard a fair balance between the rights and interests of right holders, 
on the one hand, and of users of protected works who wish to avail 
themselves of those new technologies, on the other.64
41 In light of these considerations, the Court concluded 
that the transient copying at issue in Football Associ-
ation Premier League, performed within the memory 
of a satellite decoder and on a television screen, was 
compatible with the three-step test in EU copyright 
law.65 This ruling seems to indicate that the CJEU, as 
many national courts in EU Member States, formally 
adheres to the dogma of a strict interpretation of 
exceptions. The adoption of this general principle, 
however, need not prevent the Court from arriving 
at a more balanced solution in individual cases.66 By 
contrast, the dogma of strict interpretation itself 
may be applied rather flexibly by the Court.
42 Against this background, it is of particular interest 
that in Painer/Der Standard, the CJEU again under-
lined the need for a fair balance between ‘the rights 
and interests of authors, and […] the rights of users 
of protected subject-matter’.67 More specifically, the 
Court clarified that the right of quotation in EU co-
pyright law68 
was intended to strike a fair balance between the right of freedom of 
expression of users of a work or other protected subject-matter and 
the reproduction right conferred on authors.69 
43 Along these lines drawn in the Football Associa-
tion Premier League and Painer/Der Standard de-
cisions, the CJEU may arrive at a flexible, functional 
approach to the exception for private copying with 
regard to digital lockers in the cloud. This flexible 
approach to the private copying exception would 
lead to additional revenue streams flowing from le-
vies that are due for private copying in the cloud.70 
It is noteworthy that the Court already opted for 
such a functional approach in the UsedSoft/Oracle 
case. Answering the question whether the down-
loading of software from the Internet exhausts the 
distribution right of the copyright owner, the Court 
drew a functional parallel with the sale of software 
on CD-ROM or DVD. According to the CJEU, it ma-
kes no difference
whether the copy of the computer program was made available to 
the customer by the rightholder concerned by means of a download 
from the rightholder’s website or by means of a material medium 
such as a CD-ROM or DVD.71
44 In this vein, it may be argued that it makes no diffe-
rence whether the private user has access to a cloud 
copy of her own copy of a film, or to a master copy 
of the same film that is used by the provider of digi-
tal lockers in the cloud to satisfy individual requests 
by private users who have the film in their perso-
nal collection.  
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II. Safe Harbours
45 Whereas copyright exceptions exempt certain forms 
of generating online content from the control of the 
copyright owner and, accordingly, lead to the exclu-
sion of direct liability for unauthorised use, safe har-
bours concern the question of secondary liability. A 
safe harbour can be introduced to shield platform 
providers against the risk of secondary liability for 
infringing content made available by users of on-
line platforms. Safe harbours for hosting are of par-
ticular importance in this context (section C II 1). 
The invocation of this type of safe harbour, howe-
ver, depends on appropriate reactions to notifica-
tions about infringing content (section C II 2). The 
breathing space for cloud-based services resulting 
from safe harbour regimes thus depends on the re-
quirements that follow from accompanying obliga-
tions, such as the establishment of efficient notice-
and-takedown systems.
1. Safe Harbour for Hosting
46 The so-called safe harbour for hosting relates to the 
storage of third-party content without any active in-
volvement in the selection of the hosted material. In 
the EU, the E-commerce Directive refers to an infor-
mation society service that consists of ‘the storage 
of information provided by a recipient of the ser-
vice’. This kind of safe harbour rests on the assump-
tion that a general monitoring obligation would be 
too heavy a burden for platform providers. Without 
the safe harbour, the liability risk would thwart the 
creation of platforms depending on third party con-
tent and frustrate the development of e-commerce.72 
47 With regard to safe harbours in the EU – covering all 
types of intellectual property73 – the conceptual con-
tours of the safe harbour for hosting have been cla-
rified by the CJEU in cases that concerned the unau-
thorised use of trademarks in keyword advertising 
and in offers made on online marketplaces.74 Because 
of the horizontal applicability of EU safe harbours 
across all types of intellectual property, the rules 
evolving from these trademark cases are also rele-
vant to cases involving copyrighted works. In Google 
France/Louis Vuitton, the CJEU qualified the adverti-
sing messages displayed by the Google keyword ad-
vertising service as third-party content provided by 
the advertiser and hosted by Google. These adverti-
sing messages appear once the search terms selected 
by the advertiser are entered by the Internet user. 
The advertising is thus triggered by specific ‘key-
words’. In the keyword advertising cases decided 
by the CJEU, these keywords consisted of protected 
trademarks. Accordingly, the question arose whe-
ther the search engine would be liable for trademark 
infringement. As to the applicability of the safe har-
bour for hosting in these circumstances, the Court 
pointed out that it was necessary to examine
whether the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the 
sense that its conduct is merely technical, automatic and passive, 
pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data which it stores.75 
48 The financial interest which Google has in its adver-
tising service is not decisive in the framework of this 
examination. An active involvement in the process 
of selecting keywords, by contrast, would be rele-
vant to the assessment of eligibility for the safe har-
bour.76 In the further case L’Oréal/eBay, the CJEU 
arrived at a more refined test by establishing the 
standard of ‘diligent economic operator’. The Court 
explained that it was sufficient,
in order for the provider of an information society service to be de-
nied entitlement to the exemption [for hosting], for it to have been 
aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent eco-
nomic operator should have identified the illegality in question.77  
49 While stressing that this new diligence test should 
not be misunderstood to impose a general monito-
ring obligation on platform providers, the Court in-
dicated that, under this standard, own investigations 
of the platform provider would have to be taken into 
account. Moreover, a diligent economic operator 
could be expected to consider even imprecise or in-
adequately substantiated notifications received in 
the framework of its notice-and-takedown system. 
According to the Court,
the fact remains that such notification represents, as a general rule, 
a factor of which the national court must take account when deter-
mining [...] whether the [service provider] was actually aware of facts 
or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator 
should have identified the illegality.78
50 In sum, the current development of the require-
ments to be met for successfully invoking the safe 
harbour for hosting in the EU reflects a shift from 
a general exemption from investigations to an ob-
ligation to consider even imprecise notifications. 
Platform providers must set up a knowledge ma-
nagement system that reaches a certain level of 
sophistication.79 
51 On the one hand, this development may be deemed 
desirable and consistent when focusing on service 
providers that are highly profitable enterprises. 
Market leaders in the area of online information ser-
vices are capable of investing in enhanced content 
monitoring and improved knowledge management. 
On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that 
the prerequisites for invoking the safe harbour for 
hosting also determine the entrance level for new-
comers on the market. The prerequisite of neutra-
lity and passivity constitutes a relatively low ent-
rance requirement that can be met by newcomers 
even if their financial resources are limited. A chal-
lenging knowledge management obligation that re-
quires extra staff, by contrast, leads to a substantial 
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hurdle that newcomers without much capital may 
find insurmountable.
52 A high threshold for invoking the safe harbour for 
hosting, therefore, enhances the risk of market con-
centration. While well-established, profitable busi-
nesses may have little difficulty in fulfilling know-
ledge management obligations, the risk of being held 
liable because of insufficient knowledge manage-
ment is not unlikely to inhibit newcomers from en-
tering the market. Shying away from the risk of li-
ability for third-party content, they may sell their 
ideas for new platforms to market leaders with fewer 
budget constraints. As a result, the vibrant Internet 
we know today – an effervescent source of new busi-
ness models and services often invented and imple-
mented by small providers – may become a medium 
governed by only a few major players.80
2. Notice-and-Takedown Procedures
53 As to the diversity and openness of online content, 
the requirements with regard to notice-and-take-
down procedures are to be considered as well. In 
many countries, a platform provider availing itself 
of the immunity following from the safe harbour 
for hosting is under an obligation to promptly take 
action once sufficiently substantiated information 
about infringing content is received.81 While the ob-
ligation to take measures upon notification seems 
to constitute a widely-shared standard, a survey of 
national regulations in this area sheds light on sub-
stantial differences. The detailed norms in the US 
Digital Millenium Copyright Act include not only a 
notice-and-takedown mechanism but also rules on 
counter-notices that may lead to the reinstatement 
of content.82 
54 An unjustified takedown can thus be corrected if the 
user who had posted the content sends a counter-
notice and rebuts the arguments supporting the in-
itial takedown. Ultimately, unjustified ‘censorship’ 
may thus be remedied if the effort to bring a suc-
cessful counter-notice keeps within reasonable li-
mits. Nonetheless, concerns about unjustified take-
downs have been articulated even under this system 
of notices and counter-notices.83 Against this back-
ground, it is of particular interest that recent legis-
lation in Canada departs from the notice-and-take-
down model and provides for a notice-and-notice 
system instead.84 When receiving information about 
infringing content, the platform provider is not obli-
ged to remove the content. It is sufficient for the pro-
vider to inform the user who had posted the content 
about the notice. The Canadian lawmaker, therefore, 
does not see a need for a prompt removal of allege-
dly infringing content.85
55 EU legislation reflects an opposite focus on removal. 
Rules on counter-notices are sought in vain. The EU 
system generally provides for notice-and-takedown 
rather than preferring notice-and-notice procedu-
res with regard to certain kinds of websites, such 
as social media. Upon receipt of a sufficiently subs-
tantiated notification about infringing content, the 
platform provider is obliged to act expeditiously to 
remove or disable access to the content at issue.86 It 
is an open question whether this rudimentary har-
monization stopping at the takedown step offers 
sufficient safeguards against unjustified removals. 
The current notice-and-action initiative in the EU 
may address this issue. Besides a quicker takedown 
for rights owners and increased legal certainty for 
platform providers, additional safeguards for fun-
damental rights, such as freedom of expression, are 
on the agenda.87 
III. Injunctions Against Platforms   
56 The survey of legal standards defining the brea-
thing space for cloud-based services would be in-
complete without the consideration of injunctions 
which copyright owners may obtain against plat-
forms hosting infringing content. Under EU legisla-
tion, copyright owners are in a position to apply for 
an injunction against intermediaries whose services 
are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or 
related right.88 Irrespective of the immunity against 
secondary liability that may follow from safe har-
bours for hosting, online platforms may thus be ob-
liged to take measures against infringing use of their 
services. The liability question is to be distinguis-
hed from obligations resulting from an injunction. 
In particular, the exemption from liability for hos-
ting does not shield an online platform against ob-
ligations to terminate or prevent an infringement.89
1. Impact on Cloud-Based Services
57 The potential impact of these injunctions on cloud-
based services must not be underestimated. At EU 
level, the conceptual contours of injunctions see-
king to terminate and prevent infringing use have 
been traced in cases concerning trademark rights. In 
the context of measures against trademark infringe-
ment on online marketplaces, the CJEU clarified in 
the L’Oréal/eBay case that it was possible
to order an online service provider, such as a provider making an 
online marketplace available to internet users, to take measures 
that contribute not only to bringing to an end infringements com-
mitted through that marketplace, but also to preventing further 
infringements....90
58 While the Court pointed out that this did not im-
ply a general and permanent prohibition on the use 
of goods bearing a specific trademark,91 it did make 
clear that measures had to be taken against repeat 
infringers. The Court explained that
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if the operator of the online marketplace does not decide, on its own 
initiative, to suspend the [infringer] to prevent further infringements 
of that kind by the same seller in respect of the same trade marks, it 
may be ordered, by means of an injunction, to do so.92
59 Hence, a proper balance is to be found between the 
interest of the right owner in effectively stopping 
current and preventing future infringements, and 
the interest of online platforms in not becoming 
subject to a general monitoring obligation that may 
be too heavy a burden to continue the cloud-based 
service. Hence, the question of threshold require-
ments to be met by newcomers seeking to set up a 
new cloud-based service platform again becomes re-
levant in this context. As knowledge management 
obligations arising from safe harbour regimes, ob-
ligations resulting from injunctions may constitute 
an entrance barrier for newcomers. A heavy obli-
gation with regard to the termination and preven-
tion of copyright infringement is not unlikely to 
form a market entry requirement that newcomers 
without many financial resources will find difficult 
to meet. Too heavy a termination and prevention 
obligation, therefore, enhances the risk of market 
concentration.
2. Filtering Online Content
60 The complexity of the balancing exercise resulting 
from these considerations clearly comes to the fore 
in the debate on the filtering of online content – a 
debate that, in the EU, culminated in the Scarlet/Sa-
bam ruling rendered by the CJEU. The background 
to this ruling was an initiative taken by the Belgian 
collecting society Sabam to impose an obligation on 
the Internet access provider Scarlet to put an end 
to the infringement of copyright through P2P net-
works. Sabam sought an order that would have obli-
ged Scarlet to generally prevent its customers from 
sending or receiving files containing a musical work 
of the authors, composers and editors represented 
by Sabam if these right owners have not given their 
prior permission. 
61 In its decision, the CJEU addressed the different in-
terests at stake by balancing copyright protection 
against freedom of expression and information, the 
right to privacy of Internet users, and the freedom 
of conducting a business enjoyed by online interme-
diaries. On its merits, the balancing carried out by 
the Court can be understood as an attempt to esta-
blish a harmonious relationship between different 
legal positions supported by fundamental rights and 
freedoms.93
62 In the context of this complex balancing of rights 
and freedoms, the Court found that the broad injunc-
tion sought by Sabam – amounting to the establish-
ment of a system for the general filtering of online 
content – encroached upon the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of Internet users and online interme-
diaries. For this reason, the Court rejected the in-
junction sought by SABAM:
Consequently, it must be held that, in adopting the injunction re-
quiring the ISP to install the contested filtering system, the national 
court concerned would not be respecting the requirement that a fair 
balance be struck between the right to intellectual property, on the 
one hand, and the freedom to conduct business, the right to protec-
tion of personal data and the freedom to receive or impart informa-
tion, on the other.94
63 The ruling illustrates the outer limits of injunctions 
against online intermediaries: a general filtering ob-
ligation goes too far. Online intermediaries are neit-
her obliged to embark on a systematic analysis of 
online data streams nor bound to collect data about 
users sending copyrighted content via the network. 
Moreover, a general filtering system is hardly capa-
ble of distinguishing adequately between unlawful 
and lawful content. Its introduction would inevita-
bly affect lawful communications, such as the sen-
ding of files with permissible parodies or quotations 
of protected musical works, or with musical works 
that have already fallen into the public domain.
64 The rejection of a general filtering obligation in Scar-
let/SABAM, however, leaves the question unanswe-
red whether specific filters remain permissible, such 
as a filtering obligation relating to a specific music 
file and a specific user.95 As discussed above, the CJEU 
already held in L’Oréal/eBay that measures against 
repeat infringers are legitimate. Against this back-
ground, it can be hypothesized that, between the two 
poles explored in CJEU jurisprudence – the general 
filtering rejected in Scarlet/Sabam and the specific 
filtering in the case of repeat infringers – there is 
room for configuring intermediate filtering systems 
that may give rise to new litigation and further att-
empts to balance the right to intellectual property 
against freedom of expression and information, the 
right to privacy, and freedom to conduct a business.96 
3. Blocking of Website Access
65 A variation of the filtering theme – the blocking of 
access to websites hosting or facilitating the disse-
mination of infringing content – already led to in-
junctions against Internet access providers in seve-
ral EU Member States.97 These cases shed light on an 
important difference between access and hosting 
services. While the ban on general filtering systems 
in Scarlet/Sabam exempts Internet access providers 
from the obligation to filter all communications run-
ning through their networks, the ban did not hinder 
national courts from impeding access to individual 
hosting platforms by ordering Internet access pro-
viders to block access to these websites. While the 
courts are prepared to keep the burden of filtering 
within certain limits, there seems to be increasing 
willingness to order the blocking of platforms that 
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host infringing content or systematically facilitate 
copyright infringement.
66 A general court practice of granting injunctions that 
oblige Internet access providers to block access to 
online platforms, however, may finally lead to indus-
try standards impacting the diversity of online con-
tent. Once the courts have clarified the prerequisi-
tes for the blocking of websites in several decisions, 
the creative industries and telecom operators may 
find it too burdensome to continue arguing about 
access control before the courts. Instead, they may 
return to the negotiation table to reach agreement 
on platforms that should be blocked. 
67 This scenario gives rise to concerns about de facto 
censorship of online content without control 
through democratic institutions. The creative in-
dustries will strive for the blocking of websites that 
are suspected of facilitating copyright infringement. 
Telecom companies will seek to minimize costs and 
risks by reaching a widely shared standard on blo-
cked content.98 However, parties seeking to safegu-
ard the openness of the Internet and diversity of 
online content may be absent from the negotiation 
table.99 In consequence, the list of blocked websites 
resulting from the negotiations may become longer 
than any list to which courts would have agreed af-
ter a careful balancing of all fundamental rights and 
freedoms involved. The voice of users appreciating 
information diversity and pluralism on the Internet 
may easily be overheard in negotiations focusing on 
the reconciliation of industry interests.100    
D. Conclusion
68 A survey of flexibility tools in the area of copyright 
law shows that breathing space for cloud-based ser-
vices can be derived from 
• a cautious interpretation of exclusive rights, in 
particular the right of adaptation and the right 
of communication to the public; 
• copyright exceptions for quotations, parodies 
and private copying; and 
• safe harbours that can be invoked by online plat-
forms hosting user-generated content. 
69 The availability of sufficient room for new servi-
ces finally depends on the obligations coming along 
with these flexibility tools. A flexible private copy-
ing regime will require the payment of equitable 
remuneration. Broad safe harbours for hosting will 
be accompanied by knowledge management obliga-
tions to be fulfilled in the context of notice-and-ta-
kedown procedures. Eligibility for immunity under 
a safe harbour regime does not exclude obligations 
arising from court orders to terminate or prevent 
copyright infringement. 
70 An examination of these influence factors leads to 
delicate questions about the scope of copyright pro-
tection and the limits of liability for infringement. 
Should the right of adaptation be understood to co-
ver amateur remixes of protected works that are 
presented on an online platform, such as YouTube? 
Should the right of communication to the public be 
extended to links that are embedded in a Facebook 
page? Should private copying exceptions cover the 
use of master copies by the providers of digital lo-
ckers? Should eligibility for the safe harbour for hos-
ting depend on a sophisticated knowledge manage-
ment system capable of memorizing all information 
that may help to identify infringing use? Should 
notice-and-takedown procedures be replaced with 
notice-and-notice procedures? Should the filtering 
of online content be permissible? Should websites 
that facilitate copyright infringement be blocked?
71 While it is beyond the scope of the present inquiry 
to answer all these questions, the overview of issues 
surrounding cloud-based services shows that copy-
right is embedded in a complex matrix of compe-
ting interests. User interests may be supported by 
the fundamental guarantee of freedom of expression 
and information, and the right to privacy. The pro-
viders of cloud-based services may invoke freedom 
of expression and information for enabling users to 
receive and impart information. In the EU, the fun-
damental freedom to conduct a business is to be fac-
tored into the equation as well. 
72 The Preamble of the Berne Convention recalls that 
the countries of the Berne Union are
equally animated by the desire to protect, in as effective and uni-
form a manner as possible, the rights of authors in their literary 
and artistic works…
73 While this desire is not reduced in any way when it 
comes to the question of breathing space for cloud-
based services, it follows from the analysis that in 
the cloud, protection ‘in as effective and uniform a 
manner as possible’ can only be achieved through a 
fair balancing of all rights and interests involved. In 
this balancing exercise, copyright represents an im-
portant value among others to be taken into account. 
74 Therefore, the most effective protection of copy-
right in the cloud follows from a weighing process in 
which the goals of copyright protection – incentives 
for the creative industry, an appropriate reward for 
the creative work of individual authors – are balan-
ced against the need to offer sufficient room for the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of users and pro-
viders of cloud-based services. 
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75 As a result of this balancing exercise, copyright will 
no longer be perceived as an outdated relic of the 
analogue past. Users and providers of cloud servi-
ces will understand that copyright is an integral part 
of the quid pro quo governing the use of cultural 
productions in the cloud. In consequence, copyright 
protection will no longer hang by the thread of ex-
clusive rights granted in copyright statutes – exclu-
sive rights that seem less and less enforceable. By 
contrast, copyright protection will obtain the social 
legitimacy and societal support necessary to uphold 
the copyright system in the cloud environment.101
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